Lightweight Modeling of Java Virtual Machine Security Constraints using Alloy by Reynolds, Mark C.
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Computer Science CAS: Computer Science: Technical Reports
2008-12-30
Lightweight Modeling of Java
Virtual Machine Security
Constraints using Alloy
Reynolds, Mark C. . "Lightweight Modeling of Java Virtual Machine Security
Constraints using Alloy", Technical Report BUCS-TR-2008-031, Computer Science
Department, Boston University, December 30, 2008. [Available from:
http://hdl.handle.net/2144/1723]
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/1723
Boston University
Lightweight Modeling of Java Virtual Machine
Security Constraints using Alloy
Mark C. Reynolds
Boston University Department of Computer Science
markreyn@cs.bu.edu
Abstract. The Java programming language has been widely described as secure by
design. Nevertheless, a number of serious security vulnerabilities have been discovered
in Java, particularly in the component known as the Bytecode Verifier. This paper
describes a method for representing Java security constraints using the Alloy modeling
language. It further describes a system for performing a security analysis on any
block of Java bytecodes by converting the bytes into relation initializers in Alloy. Any
counterexamples found by the Alloy analyzer correspond directly to insecure code.
Analysis of a real-world malicious applet is given to demonstrate the efficacy of the
approach.
Introduction. This paper will describe an analysis tool for verifying security
constraints within Java bytecodes. This investigation was motivated by the contin-
ued appearance of malicious Java code that violates the security constraints imposed
by the Java compiler, the Java Bytecode Verifier and the Java runtime. The analysis
approach is based on the lightweight modeling language Alloy [AL, DJ]. This paper
will describe the security verification approach taken by the Java Virtual Machine
(JVM), and briefly enumerate some of the ways that it has been circumvented. A
review of the top level goals of this work will then be presented, followed by a hierar-
chical description of the design of the analysis tool and its implementation. Results
will then be presented in detail using a real-world example of malicious code: the
BlackBox applet. Finally, a path toward future work on the analysis tool will be
described.
The analysis tool has, in fact, proven to be a powerful approach to analyzing JVM
security constraints. The approach of applying lightweight modeling as a means to
check JVM security constraints appears to be a new approach.
Background. The Java programming language has been touted as “secure by
design” since its inception. However, attacks against Java security have been promul-
gated from the earliest days of Java. Felten discovered several weaknesses in the Java
security model almost immediately, and his work on Java [FE] contains an extensive
list of early exploits. The development of Java malware has continued unabated up to
the present. The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures project [CV] lists numerous
Java bugs that can lead to privilege escalation, sensitive data exfiltration, denial of
service and other malicious outcomes. Of particular note is the BlackBox malicious
Java applet [BB, LS]. This applet exploits a number of Java security weaknesses,
and was widely deployed, infecting thousands of machines. The BlackBox applet not
only breaks out of the supposedly invulnerable sandbox that the Java applet runtime
imposes, it also manages to escalate its privilege to the highest possible level (since
BlackBox is specific to the Windows operating system, this is the SYSTEM privilege,
equivalent to root on a Unix/Linux machine). The BlackBox applet can be easily
customized to download any program to the infected machine and then run it. This
applet is thus not only an exploit in itself; it is also a delivery vehicle for an arbitrary
malicious payload. The BlackBox applet will be analyzed using the methodology
presented in this paper.
In order to understand how these security failures come about, and also to un-
derstand the motivations for developing the analysis tool described in this paper, it
is first necessary to briefly review the Java security model. Java security is enforced
in three ways. The Java compiler has a large number of rules that it enforces in
order to ensure that the syntax and semantics of the Java language are satisfied, but
also to prohibit certain actions that are known to be associated with malicious code.
For example, the Java compiler will refuse to compile any program that contains a
method that makes use of an uninitialized variable. The output of the Java compiler
is a binary file known as a classfile. In order for a Java application or applet to use
the methods provided by a class, it must load the classfile that contains that class
into the process or thread that is utilizing its methods. Loading is accomplished by
a Java classloader. Every Java classloader will implicitly invoke the Java Bytecode
Verifier. The Bytecode Verifier checks that the contents of the classfile conform to the
classfile format. More importantly, the Bytecode Verifier also verifies a large number
of security constraints before it will allow the classloader to succeed. The final part
of Java security enforcement is handled by the Java runtime, which performs array
bounds checking, runtime type conversion checking and a number of other tests.
Almost all Java exploits to date have used weaknesses in the Bytecode Verifier.
The Bytecode Verifier is a part of the JVM, and the rules that it checks when analyzing
a classfile are described in great detail in the JVM specification [JV]. The Bytecode
Verifier uses a constraint based approach in performing its analysis. For example,
it checks that all local variables are written before being read, that each instruction
receives precisely the set of operands that it is expecting, that the stack has the same
depth at each program point regardless of execution path used to reach that program
point, and many other constraints.
Our approach uses Alloy to perform constraint analysis on Java bytecodes. It
attempts to emulate the constraint checking that is ostensibly being performed by the
Bytecode Verifier. In Alloy it is very easy to express constraints in terms of formulas
involving relations, and therefore it has proven to be a rich environment for checking
Java security constraints. Some previous efforts have been made to apply formal
methods to Java bytecodes [XU], but these efforts have used a more heavyweight
model checking approach that attempts to prove soundness, as opposed to Alloy’s
lightweight constraint based approach that converts assertions into Boolean formulas
and then searches for satisfaction assignments or the existence of counterexamples.
Goals. This work described in this paper has three goals: (1) to provide an
extensible framework for modeling security constraints imposed by the JVM’s Byte-
code Verifier; and (2) to provide a concrete model for as many security constraints as
possible, and (3) to demonstrate that the analysis tool does check them correctly.
It would be straightforward to use Alloy to create a model for a specific block
of Java bytecode. While this might serve as the demonstration of the applicability
of Alloy to security analysis of the JVM, this would have little value in analyzing
compliance with the JVM security constraints as a whole. Therefore, it is desirable
to have an extensible model. In this context “extensible” means that the model must
have the ability to be applied to any block of JVM code and to perform analysis on
that code against a specified set of constraints. In the Design section it will be shown
how this goal was realized.
Several of the security constraints imposed by the JVM have already been men-
tioned. As indicated above, the JVM checks against a substantial number of such
constraints. In general, most constraints are independent of one another, although
there are some functional overlaps, as will be demonstrated below. In order to prove
the soundness of the basic concept, it was deemed prudent to select a realistic sub-
set of the total set of JVM security constraints and begin with a simple model that
would encompass that reduced subset of constraints. In developing the model for
this initial set of constraints, with the extensibility goal in mind, a general framework
for code analysis was created such that adding additional constraints would involve
only incremental modifications, and not a complete restructuring of the model code.
The current implementation concretely models a small set of security constraints.
While certain technical challenges, such as providing a complete model of exception
handling, have not yet been addressed, the work to date strongly suggests that the
current implementation can be readily adapted to additional constraints. A survey
of next steps is given in the Future Work section of this paper.
Design. Alloy is a lightweight modeling language that uses first order logic. In
Alloy the concept of a “relation” is central. Alloy is capable of analyzing assertions
for satisfiability and also for the existence of counterexamples. A key observation
is that the security constraints imposed by the JVM can be modeled as invariants,
and thus can be analyzed by the Alloy Analyzer. Alloy is not a proof system, so the
failure to find a counterexample to a constraint is not a proof that that constraint
is satisfied, only that the constraint is satisfied within the search space specified. If
a counterexample is found, however, that does indicate that the invariant has been
violated, and the Alloy Analyzer conveniently provides a graphical representation of
that counterexample.
In light of the extensibility goal described in the previous section, the initial design
problem was to find an implementation of the Alloy model that would capture the
invariants of interest abstractly, independent of any actual JVM code, but would
then permit the model to be run against any concrete realization of such JVM code.
Initial experimentation with Alloy suggested two possible approaches: automatically
generate Alloy functions, facts or predicates based on the JVM code to be analyzed,
or automatically generate Alloy statements that initialized relations based on the
JVM code to be analyzed. In order to realize a classical code/data separation, it
was decided to use the latter approach. Thus, the Alloy model would be realized as a
template containing a fixed set of relations, functions, facts, predicates and assertions.
This model would then be supplemented by relation initializers that would be derived
from particular JVM code. In this approach, the template portion of the Alloy
model would be completely independent of any choice of Java bytecodes, while the
initializers would depend only weakly on the detailed implementation of the template.
Specifically, the initializers being generated would only depend on the set of relations
being initialized, and not on any specific way in which the constraints were realized
in the model template. This decoupling between the “data” portion of the model and
the “code” portion of the model is the means by which the stated extensibility goal
has been achieved.
Further requirements analysis revealed that these two top level components, the
model template and the initializers, could be further refined into four components: (1)
the relation definitions; (2) the relation initializers; (3) the execution engine; and (4)
the constraint assertions. The relation definitions, execution engine and constraint
assertions are all part of the Alloy model template. The relation definitions are Alloy
definitions of the top level signatures, which are atoms which contain relations, as well
as the definitions of the relations themselves. As will be seen in the Implementation
section, these relation definitions capture the static properties of individual JVM
instructions, as well as capturing the JVM state as the execution engine executes.
All other components of the Alloy model are logically dependent on the relation
definitions.
The relation initializers are the initial values of the Alloy relations. They are
generated from specific JVM code, and vary from one invocation of the model to
the next. An initial design decision was made to capture JVM code at the method
level. This, of course, is a trade off between performance and granularity. It is
certainly possible to model multiple methods within a single model. However, the
time that Alloy takes to analyze a particular model is strongly dependent on the
number of (program execution) states, which, in turn is strongly dependent on the
size of the relation initializers. As will be seen below, the actual Alloy model template
is quite suited to analyzing code blocks within a method, and could be extended to
handle multiple methods. Relation initializers need to be generated from specific
Java methods. Therefore, there needs to be an automatic way of converting the Java
bytecodes in a method into these relation initializers. To this end, a Java classfile
parser was created to perform this conversion. The parser takes a Java classfile as
input and produces an Alloy model fragment as output. When the model fragment is
combined with the Alloy template, a complete Alloy model is produced, as is shown
in Figure 1 below.
The relation definitions and their initializers form a static representation of a
set of properties of the Java method being analyzed. In order to observe dynamic
behavior, this static representation needed to be extended with model actions that
would mimic the execution of the JVM itself, at least to the extent that the JVM’s
Bytecode Verifier would synthetically execute method code in order to perform its
own constraint checking. Thus, an execution engine was needed. This execution
Figure 1: Constructing a complete Alloy model using the classfile parser
engine would represent the flow of execution through the medium of stateful relations.
Alloy’s “ordering” utility is used for representing this state. Execution could not be
unbounded, of course, since Alloy only performs analysis over a finite set of states. It
would have been possible to simply let Alloy “fall off the end” of execution, which is
to say to allow the analyzer to perform an exhaustive analysis of all possible states
in the state space. For both performance and structural reasons this was deemed
to be an unacceptable solution. Therefore, the execution engine was designed such
that certain JVM instructions are designated as terminal instructions. (Any type of
return instruction would be terminal, for example.) The execution engine was then
implemented to recognize this condition and act on it in such a way as to create no
further unique states. Of course, this models the actual execution of the JVM itself.
Certain instructions within a method are, in fact, terminal, in that they cause the
method to be exited. One obvious question is the manner in which iterative constructs
are handled by the execution engine. Would it provide better model fidelity to have
the execution engine attempt to exactly mimic runtime execution, or would this
lead to unacceptable performance penalties? In fact, the execution engine does not
attempt to perform any branch prediction analysis in the model. The precise way in
which this was handled, and its implications, will be explained in the Implementation
section below.
Finally, the model must provide for a way in which each JVM security constraint
is actually checked by Alloy. Formulating the security constraints as Alloy assertions
proved to be straightforward once the model had been constructed to accurately
reflect the static and dynamic properties of the method code.
Implementation. The implementation of the JVM security constraints analyzer
will be described in three subsections. In the first subsection, the three components
of the model template, namely the relation definitions, the execution engine, and the
security constraint assertions, will be described. In the second subsection, the imple-
mentation of the Class2Alloy classfile parser which is used to generate the relation
initializers will be discussed. In the third section a concrete example will be dissected,
including a description of the parser invocation and subsequent model analysis. The
example in question is a reduced form of the BlackBox applet.
Model Template. The model template employs two top level signatures, an “In-
struction” signature and a “State” signature. The Instruction signature is made ab-
stract in order that each of the individual instructions that make up a method can be
defined as concrete, atomic extensions of this abstract signature. Intuitively, this is
reasonable because the properties (relations) of instructions vary from instruction to
instruction, but are still static for any particular instruction. For example, the length
of a given instruction in bytes is fixed for all time once the instruction is specified, but
obviously varies between instructions. The “State” signature is derived from Alloy’s
ordering utility, which predefines certain relations such as “first”, “next” and “last”.
The State signature is dynamic, and the values of its relations are updated by the
execution engine as it executes during analysis. The Alloy definition of these two
signatures is shown below.
abstract sig Instruction { map: Int,
term: lone Int,
r: set Int,
w: set Int,
ubt: lone Int,
cbt: lone Int,
smod: Int,
len: Int }
sig State {
prog: Instruction,
readers: set Int,
writers: set Int,
depth: Int }
An Alloy model is defined by its relations, so a careful description of each of the
relations shown above will serve to illuminate the rest of the implementation. In the
Instruction signature the map relation defines the byte offset of the instruction from
the beginning of the method (or other block of code) being analyzed. The value of
the map relation is an integer. The term relation is a set of integers that is either
empty, or contains a single value. If the set is non-empty and contains the value 1,
then the instruction is a terminal instruction – it causes the execution engine to cease
creating new states. Note that it would have been entirely acceptable to model this
relation as a Boolean taking the values 0 or 1. This implementation would have lead
to more cluttered Alloy code, however, as most instructions are not terminal, while
the chosen implementation allows the relation initializers to refrain from mentioning
those relations for which the value is the empty set. The r and w relations model
the sets of local variables read or written by the instruction, respectively. It is quite
possible for an instruction to access more than one local variable, so these relations
must be modeled as sets of integers. (The JVM itself also describes local variables
in terms of integers.) The ubt relation names a possible unconditional branch target
for the instruction. Most instructions do not have such a target, so the value of
this relation is usually the empty set. An instruction can have at most one such
target. If such a target exists, it is specified as a byte offset from the beginning of
the method or code block, which is identical to the manner in which it is encoded in
a classfile. The cbt relation names a possible conditional branch target. Conditional
branch targets occur with conditional instructions. An unconditional branch target
represents a transfer of control that must be executed, while a conditional branch
target represents one that might be executed. Note that in the JVM it is possible
for a conditional branch instruction to have multiple targets, but for simplicity this
is not currently modeled. The smod relation models the number of bytes that the
instruction modifies the method stack. This can be a positive integer (item(s) are
pushed onto the stack), a negative integer (item(s) are popped off the stack) or zero.
Finally, the len relation models the length of the instruction in bytes. Note that len
and map contain redundant information, in that it should be the case that next->map
= current->map + current->len. This redundancy was introduced deliberately as an
additional way of validating the internal consistency of the model, as will be further
described shortly.
The State signature represents the dynamic execution state. Its prog relation mod-
els the current instruction being executed; its readers and writers relations model the
current set of local variables that have been read or written up to the current pro-
gram point, respectively, and its depth relation models the current depth of the stack
up to the current program point. As the execution engine processes the instruction
initializers, it effectively creates new State atoms presenting the execution state after
the effects of the current instruction have been applied.
The execution engine contains the Alloy code associated with State initialization,
State sequencing, and execution termination. State initialization code is fixed within
the model template and is not subject to being generated as part of relation initial-
ization. The State initialization code creates an initial state s0, sets the readers and
writers relations of s0 to be empty, sets the depth relation of s0 to be zero, and sets
the prog relation of s0 to be the special “startup” instruction. Note that here is no ac-
tual JVM instruction named “startup.” However, when the JVM invokes a method it
performs certain very specific startup actions (the so-called method prologue) before
the first instruction of that method in executed. The pseudo-instruction startup cap-
tures these actions. Specifically, when the JVM enters a method it will set the value
of the local variable 0 to be “this.” If the method has arguments, these arguments are
placed in local variables starting at index 1. Thus, the startup instruction will always
have a non-empty value for its w relation; its r relation will be empty and the depth
relation will have the value 0. This will vary depending on the method signature,
however, so that the initializer for the startup instruction must be generated by the
classfile parser. By convention, the startup instruction is located at a map value of
-1, and has length 1.
State transitions and also execution termination are handled by an Alloy fact
known as stateTransition:
fact stateTransition {
all s: State - ord/last |
let s' = ord/next[s] |
( some t: s.prog.term | t = 1 ) =>
sameState[s, s'] else
nextState[s, s'] }
The model of execution is that the nextState predicate is executed for each non-
terminal state. The nextState predicate is shown below. This predicate is responsible
for updating the execution state relations (readers, writers and depth) and advancing
the instruction state. This predicate first calls the nextInstruction predicate, which
updates the value of the current instruction for s’. It then updates the reader and
writer relations for the new State s’ by calling predicates that take the unions of
the corresponding r and w sets from the current instruction s.prog with the values
of readers and writers from the current state s, respectively. Finally, it updates the
depth relation for s’ by adding the smod value of the current instruction to the depth
in the current State s.
pred nextState[s, s': State] {
nextInstruction[s.prog, s'.prog] &&
nextReader[s.prog, s.readers, s'.readers] &&
nextWriter[s.prog, s.writers, s'.writers] &&
(s'.depth = add[s.depth, s.prog.smod]) }
The nextInstruction predicate calculates the next instruction for the state s’ as
follows. If the current instruction has an unconditional branch target, as evinced by
the fact that the current instruction’s ubt relation is non-empty, then the uncondi-
tional branch is taken. The next instruction is the one whose map value (byte offset)
matches the value of the ubt for the current instruction. This raises the interesting
possibility that the JVM bytecodes were sufficiently damaged that the ubt relation
pointed to a map value that was not represented by any instruction, e.g. that the ubt
pointed to the middle of an instruction, or outside the method entirely. This internal
consistency constraint is checked by the Terminates predicate described below.
If there was no unconditional branch target, but there was a conditional branch
target, then Alloy can choose to take that branch or it can instead simply go to the
next instruction in the map by adding the current value of the map relation to the
length of the current instruction. It will also perform this latter action in case there
are no branches of either type. Note that the current (incomplete) model of exception
handling treats an exception as a possible conditional branch for the entire range of
instructions protected by a particular handler; the conditional branch target is the
beginning of the handler code.
pred nextInstruction[from, to: Instruction] {
some from.ubt =>
( to.map = from.ubt ) else
( ( to.map = add[from.map, from.len] ) ||
some bt: from.cbt { to.map = bt } ) }
The Alloy model template currently captures only a small number of JVM se-
curity constraints as Alloy assertions. The security constraints being checked are
the local variable constraint, the stack depth invariance constraint, the stack guard
constraint, the branch consistency constraint and the instruction length constraint.
The local variable constraint states that no local variable can be read until it has
first been written. The purpose of this constraint is to avoid accessing uninitialized
local variables. The Java compiler enforces this constraint at the source code level
for any variable (not just those that end up being stored in JVM local variables),
and the Bytecode Verifier checks it at the classfile level. The stack depth invariance
constraint states that the depth of the stack will always be the same at any program
point, no matter how that program point was reached. The stack depth constraint is
one of the constraints that is violated by the BlackBox applet, and will be discussed
further below. The stack guard constraint is actually an amalgam of several closely
related constraints. It states that the depth of the stack never become negative, and
also that it should be zero on method entry and on any branch that leads to method
exit, which is at any terminal instruction for the method. This latter constraint is
a critical constraint for the JVM architecture. Unlike the architectures of many real
machines, the JVM does not use the stack to pass parameters or return values; local
variables are always used for both. Thus, the state of the stack (empty) should be the
same on exit as on entry, for every method. Each of the constraints corresponds to a
single Alloy assertion. The branch consistency constraint and the instruction length
constraint are different forms of the same consistency check, namely that neither nor-
mal flow of execution nor execution of any branch can put the JVM into a state in
which it is not at an instruction boundary. Finally, there is also a special predicate
that performs consistency checks on the model. The assertions and the predicate are:
assert LocalVar { all s: State | s.readers in s.writers }
assert StackDepth {
all s, s' : State | (s.prog.map = s'.prog.map) =>
(s.depth = s'.depth) }
assert StackGTE { all s : State | gte[s.depth, 0] }
pred Terminates {
some finalState : State | finalState.prog.term = 1 }
Note that each of the constraints is expressible in a single Alloy statement. The
local variable constraint, LocalVar, asserts that for all States, the set of integers in the
readers relation must be a subset of the set of integers in the writers relation. Since a
State has a 1-1 correspondence with a program point (except for the special State that
has “startup” as its Instruction) this exactly expresses the local variable constraint.
The stack depth invariance constraint, StackDepth, asserts that for any pair of States
s and s’ that have the same program point (s.prog.map = s’.prog.map) the depth
of the stack must be the same (s.depth = s’.depth). The stack guard constraint as
shown, StackGTE, asserts that for all States the corresponding stack depth must be
greater than or equal to zero. These constraints are positive constraints: if Alloy finds
a counterexample this demonstrates that the constraint has been violated. A violation
of the constraint then indicates that the corresponding JVM code does not conform
to the classfile standard, and contains buggy or potentially malicious bytecode. It is
worthwhile to observe, however, that the existence of nonconforming bytecode does
not necessarily imply that the resulting code is exploitable.
The “Terminates” predicate bears closer examination, since it relates to the han-
dling of looping constructs and also internal consistency checking. This predicate
asserts that there is some State with an Instruction that is terminal. In effect, this
predicate asserts that execution terminates for some set of branch choices. When
faced with a conditional branch choice, Alloy will choose a possibility. Thus, if there
is any path to the terminal instruction, it will be reached by some set of choices by
Alloy (provided the search space is large enough). What conditions could case this
predicate to fail? One case would be the case of an unconditional branch whose target
is an earlier program point. This could correspond to JVM code that contained an
unambiguous infinite loop, such as one with a “while ( true )” test. Another situation
that would cause this predicate to fail is if the map and len relations are not inter-
nally consistent. Examination of the nextInstruction predicate shows that if there
are no branches the Instruction in the next State is calculated from the Instruction
in the current State by adding the length of the current Instruction (the len relation)
to the byte offset of the current Instruction (the map relation). Alloy must then
find a matching Instruction whose offset (map relation) is equal to this sum. If no
such Instruction exists, then the nextInstruction predicate will return false and the
Terminates predicate will never be satisfied. The Terminates predicate therefore also
provides a test of the internal consistency of the map and len relations, and thus also
indirectly checks the constraints that assert that the JVM can never reach a program
point that is not at the beginning of an instruction.
Class2Alloy Classfile Parser. The model template is not a complete Alloy model
in that it does not encode any property information of an actual JVM method. That
encoding is handled by the relation initializers, which must initialize all the Instruc-
tion relations based on the bytecodes of a specified method. The initialization must
also handle the creation of concrete signatures that extend the abstract Instruction
signature. Again, these concrete instruction signatures are based on exactly those
instructions that are in the specified method.
A classfile parser, known as Class2Alloy, was written to generate these Alloy
relation initializers given a Java classfile and also a method name. Class2Alloy was
implemented in Java using the Byte Code Engineering Library, BCEL [BC]. BCEL
is an extremely powerful classfile analysis library that provides ready access to the
instruction stream in Java classes. BCEL makes it straightforward to extract the
requisite properties for each instruction under consideration.
Class2Alloy is implemented in two Java files, Class2Alloy.java and AlloyString.java.
Class2Alloy contains the main analysis routines, while AlloyString is a utility class
that handles the specific Alloy syntax needed to generate syntactically correct relation
initializers. The operation of the parser is as follows. The main() method receives
three arguments: the name of a classfile, which must be in the classpath, the name of
a method, and the name of an output file. The main() method creates a Class2Alloy
instance; the Class2Alloy constructor creates a set of empty AlloyStrings, one for
each relation to be initialized, along with an empty AlloyString that will hold the in-
struction signature information. The main() method then calls the doInput() method
with the first two command line arguments. The doInput() method uses BCEL to
load the classfile, enumerate its methods, and then searches for the named method
in the array of methods present. If it fails to find a method with that name, an
exception is thrown. On success doInput() returns a Method object, Method being a
BCEL data type. The main() method then checks to see if the Method is abstract;
if so, it prints an error message and exits. If not, it calls the main analysis method,
doAnalyzeMethod(). The doAnalyzeMethod() method parses the Method object to
obtain a list of instructions contained within the method. For each instruction, it
then queries that instruction for those properties that need to be initialized in the
Alloy model, namely its byte offset from the beginning of the method, its byte length,
the sets of local variables that it reads or writes, the set of possible conditional or
unconditional branches that it can take, and also the number of bytes that it adds
or removes from the stack. The doAnalyzeMethod() method then calls utility meth-
ods to update the AlloyString objects with the information just obtained. When
the doAnalyzeMethod() method returns the output file is then opened, and each Al-
loyString object is asked to print itself to that output file. The toString() method
in the AlloyString class handles the gory details of generating syntactically correct
Alloy output for each of the relation initializers, as well as generating the appropriate
Instruction extension signatures for each instruction in the method being analyzed.
Once this output file is combined with the model template, a complete model
specialized for the method under analysis is obtained. The Alloy analyzer is then be
run on that model, and each of the constraint assertions, as well as the Terminates
consistency predicate, is invoked to determine the presence of counterexamples or a
failure to converge to a terminal state.
Analysis of the BlackBox applet. The BlackBox applet is a malicious applet that
breaks out of the applet execution sandbox, elevates its privilege level to the maximum
permitted value, and then downloads (and optionally executes) a completely arbitrary
payload. In 2002 this applet was prevalent on the Internet, infecting thousands of
machines. The BlackBox applet uses a variety of exploitation techniques in order to
achieve its goals. A complete description of the workings of this applet is beyond the
scope of this paper; instead a reduced version will be described. It is very important
to note that both the reduced version and the complete version of BlackBox are
detected by the technique described in this paper.
The Java virtual machine loads classes using a series of helper classes known as
classloaders. The classloader class responsible for loading classes across the network
is the URLClassLoader class. URLClassLoader not only verifies classfile syntax, it
works closely with the SecurityManager class to check for permitted or forbidden
operations. As one might readily imagine, most of the methods and members of
URLClassLoader are either protected or private. If it were possible to define a class
(call it myUCL) that had the same methods and members as URLClassLoader, but
which permitted all operations and did not consult the SecurityManager, one could
then load and instantiate an arbitrary network class. This type of security exploit
is known as a type confusion exploit – an object of one class (URLClassLoader) is
replaced by an object of another class (myUCL) without triggering a type coercion
exception.
One way to cause type confusion to occur is to violate the stack depth invariance
constraint. Suppose that an object of type myUCL is placed on the stack, followed
by an object of type URLClassLoader. Suppose further than in the normal flow of
execution the URLClassLoader object will be popped off the stack and loaded into
an automatic variable of that type. If the flow of control can be modified such that
the stack depth invariance constraint is violated, and such that the URLClassLoader
object is popped off the stack while leaving the JVM state unmodified, then a sub-
sequent stack operation will pop the myUCL object off the stack and treat it as if it
were an object of type URLClassLoader. One approach for doing this was through
the use of malicious exception handling code. When an exception is thrown in Java,
an exception object is placed on the stack so that the exception handler code may ac-
cess it. After the handler completes, the state of the stack is supposed to be restored
to the state it had just before the exception was thrown. If it can be arranged that
the malicious exception code actually modifies the stack such that two objects are
popped when the handler exits, the stack depth invariance constraint will be violated.
This process is illustrated in Figure 2. The net effect in the actual BlackBox applet is
that an object of type myUCL is substituted for an actual URLClassLoader object;
this object is then used to load malicious code over the network and execute it. (As
stated above, the actual process is significantly more complicated.)
More than a hundred applets were downloaded and subjected to analysis using the
Alloy analyzer; no stack depth invariance constraint violations were found. However,
when the bytecodes from the full or reduced version of BlackBox were analyzed, a
violation of the stack guard invariance constraint was detected. Detailed security
analysis with a Java disassembler (such as [DJ]) then revealed that a type confusion
attack was being launched by this applet. Note that the applet itself could not
have been compiled directly from Java; the malicious portions, in particular those
portions handling the type confusion attack, had to have been constructed using a
Java assembler, such as Jasmin [JA].
Figure 2: Stack depth invariance constraint violated in a malicious exception handler
Future Work. There are several areas in which the JVM security analysis ap-
proach described in this paper can be extended and improved. The most obvious,
and certainly the most important, is to add constraint checking for additional con-
straints. The opcode argument constraint, which states that each JVM instruction
is invoked with the correct number of type-conforming arguments, is of particular
importance. In addition, extending the current consistency checking of the map and
len properties is also a worthwhile step, since the current model does not distinguish
the two possible cases in which the Terminates predicate fails to converge, namely
infinite loops versus an inconsistent set of map and len relation values. The latter
should be checked explicitly.
The current model does not completely handle exceptions. In particular, only a
single exception block per method is currently modeled, while actual bytecode can
employ multiple (nested) exception blocks. Since exploitation of exception handling
is one of the key concepts of BlackBox, adding full exception handling to the model
has high priority. This is an ongoing area of further research.
The cbt relation currently permits at most one conditional branch target. This
means that any Java method that contains an instruction with multiple conditional
branch targets, such as the tableswitch instruction, will not be handled properly by
the current model. This must be addressed by a more complete model, since most Java
compilers will generate a tableswitch bytecode for “switch” statements that appear in
the Java source.
Finally, the current analysis tool would benefit significantly from increased au-
tomation. Since Alloy itself is written in Java, the Class2Alloy class could be modi-
fied to create an Alloy model in memory, using the template and its current relation
analysis code, and could then invoke the Alloy analyzer directly on that in-memory
representation of the model. This would significantly speed up analysis of multiple
methods in a single classfile, or, indeed analysis of multiple classfiles.
Conclusion. This paper has demonstrated that Alloy is an extremely powerful
tool for performing JVM security constraint analysis on Java bytecodes. Even at
this early stage of development, where only a few constraints have been modeled,
meaningful results have already been obtained. Extensions to this work are ongoing
with the goal of increase the scope of constraint checking and further refining and
improving the analysis process.
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